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DE RUEH KI #0322/01 0960806  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
O 060806Z APR 09  
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9424  
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE  
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC  
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE  
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000322

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [CG](#)

SUBJECT: FARDC INTEGRATION PROCEEDS, HALTINGLY

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Father Apollinaire Malu Malu recently shared data (as of March 30) with the International Facilitation on North Kivu integration activities. According to his data, around 11,000 of the approximately 28,000 persons who have undergone some form of military integration since January are as yet "unidentified." Malu Malu insists that government officials have accelerated their efforts to complete identification as soon as possible. For the moment, however, a large number of armed men present in North Kivu in FARDC uniforms are essentially behaving as bandits. Malu Malu has not yet secured GDRC funding necessary to undertake corresponding integration activities in South Kivu. The Hutu (Mugabo/Museveni) and Nande (La Fontaine) wings of PARECO remain dissatisfied with the overall state of affairs. They have been expressing to us what others are doubtless thinking: the process is stacked in favor of the CNDP and against the other armed groups. End Summary.

#### Haphazard North Kivu Integration

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¶2. (SBU) Father Apollinaire Malu Malu, the GDRC's point person for integration issues, shared with us what appear to be the most up-to-date (as of March 30) figures on North Kivu FARDC integration activities. According to the data, around 11,000 of the approximately 28,000 persons who have undergone some form of military integration since January are as yet "unidentified." There is no formal record of who they are, to what unit they are assigned, of what force they previously were part, and whether or not they are indeed Congolese or otherwise eligible to be FARDC members. This means that there is no way for them to show up on any payroll, though commanders are believed to be collecting pay based on gross numbers. The result of all this is predictable: a large increase in acts of banditry committed both in the countryside and in towns (including Goma itself), threats of systematic looting by FARDC in the northern and central parts of the province, and confusion over rank and command structures.

¶3. (SBU) Malu Malu insists that government officials have accelerated their efforts to complete identification as soon as possible. Currently, however, a large number of armed men are present in North Kivu in FARDC uniforms who are essentially behaving as bandits, while the better-structured (though of course nominally no longer extant) armed groups, particularly CNDP and the Hutu wing of PARECO, retain much of their identity, cohesion, and command structure within a vague FARDC framework.

¶4. (SBU) However, even the CNDP was unable to adhere to the requisite one fighter/one weapon rule: 4,611 CNDP fighters entered "accelerated" integration (for which having a weapon in working order was supposed to be a requirement), presenting 2,352 weapons. Those without a weapon were all supposed to go into "classical" integration, where only three CNDP fighters actually ended up, along with one FARDC soldier (Comment: North Kivu integration has therefore been carried out with no reference to any criteria, with virtually all CNDP and PARECO comers directed into accelerated

integration. End Comment). There are also rumors among the other armed groups of concealed CNDP units and hidden arms caches, including heavy weapons.

15. (SBU) Malu Malu said the question of military payrolls should be dealt with rationally. As he pointed out, the Independent Electoral Commission managed a huge payroll nationwide with few problems, mostly by taking advantage of the cash-transfer facilities afforded by the mobile-phone service providers, which ensured that funds went directly to the employees.

... And No South Kivu Integration

16. (SBU) Malu Malu, however, has not yet secured the GDRC funding necessary to undertake corresponding integration activities in South Kivu. On February 28, the South Kivu armed groups (with the notable exception of the FRF) undertook to complete integration and cease to exist as armed groups within 34 days, i.e., by April 4. To date, nothing specific has happened.

17. (SBU) South Kivu integration, once it starts, will differ considerably from the process in North Kivu, partly because the CNDP has to a large extent been the motor of integration in the latter and has no real equivalent in South Kivu. At 35,000, the declared strength of all the South Kivu armed groups (not including the FRF) is a gross exaggeration, and those who will come in with weapons are likely to be far fewer in relation to the total than in North Kivu. This means that, if things are handled with at least a bit more rigor than in North Kivu, most South Kivu armed group elements will go into classical integration: barracks, training, and assignment to

KINSHASA 00000322 002 OF 002

recognizable units. MONUC is preparing to support the four proposed regroupment centers, which will include the already well-equipped Luberizi complex.

Armed Group Mutterings

18. (SBU) The Hutu (Mugabo/Museveni) and Nande (La Fontaine) wings of PARECO are dissatisfied with the state of affairs, and they have been expressing to us what others are doubtless thinking: the process is stacked in favor of CNDP and against the other armed groups. The GDRC-CNDP agreement calls, for example, for automatic transfer of rank upon joining the FARDC. The armed group agreements are more equivocal: rank transfers will be considered (though Malu Malu insists they will be granted anyway). Moreover, CNDP rank transfers have in fact already been recognized: CNDP colonels are deployed as "Sector" or "Axis" commanders, whereas others, including La Fontaine who claims to be a Colonel, are still waiting.

19. (SBU) Comment: The issue of rank is important, of course, to the individuals concerned and to those under their direct command, who will assume that their needs will be better attended to if they can enter FARDC attached to a senior commander. But it goes beyond these concerns: what PARECO (and doubtless others) are saying is that to get respect, you have to be a successful rebel. Loyalty to the GRDC is not enough, many believe. The current pro-"Rwandophonie" trend in North Kivu is evidence of this, they say. The CNDP, which declared itself outside of GDRC control, is now receiving benefits and patronage, while other groups and their communities have received far less attention. This trend has not yet led to an open rebellion among the armed groups and their constituents, but there are mutterings and portents that the GDRC would do well to heed this tendency.

110. (SBU) Comment continued: As Malu Malu well understands, a key prerequisite for sorting out this situation is for all units to be regrouped in barracks, identified, and assigned to recognizable, stable units under a clear command structure. We are a long way from accomplishing this. Consolidation of military command and control, which is admittedly showing some signs of progress in certain parts of North Kivu, needs to accelerate, otherwise some kind of new and hard-to-control fragmentation could occur.

¶11. (SBU) Comment continued: For now, PARECO and others are eager to be viewed (however implausibly, based on their past history) as capable and savvy allies in the campaign against the FDLR. However, their links and affinities with the latter cannot have been swept away so easily. This does not signal an imminent collapse of the nascent peace. Nevertheless, as certain armed groups begin to perceive that they have been marginalized, serious obstacles to durable stability could re-emerge. End Comment.

GARVELINK